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1 Introduction
In cooperative game theory with transferable utilities, the Shapley value
(Shapley (1953)) is a widely used solution concept. It always exists, is
unique, and given by an explicit formula that pays each player his average
marginal contribution. Unlike the Shapley value, the prenucleolus and the
nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) are solutions of a minimization problem. The
prenucleolus is the set of efficient payoffs that lexicographically minimizes
the “dissatisfaction” of all coalitions. The nucleolus is also the solution to a
similar minimization problem but differs from the prenucleolus in requiring
the payoff vector to be individually rational. The prenucleolus always exists
and is unique while the nucleolus is unique but exists only when the set of
individually rational and efficient payoff vectors is non-empty. In this pa-
per, we identify conditions under which the prenucleolus coincides with the
Shapley value.
It is easy to show that the Shapley value and the prenucleolus coincide
on all two player games. From the axiomatization of prenucleolus (Sobolev
(1975)) and the Shapley value (Hart and Mas-Colell (1989)), we know that
both these solution concepts satisfy efficiency and symmetry and hence they
also coincide on all symmetric TU games. However, the results of Sobolev
(1975) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) also imply that the prenucleolus and
the Shapley value differ in terms of the consistency properties.1 Therefore,
for non-symmetric TU games with three or more players, there is no reason
to expect that these two solution concepts to coincide.
Yet, there are applications involving non-symmetric TU games where
the Shapley value and the prenucleolus do coincide. This was first demon-
strated in the context of undirected graphs and hypergraphs by Deng and
Papadimitriou (1994). Subsequently, van den Nouweland, Borm, Brouwers,
Bruinderink and Tijs (1996) applied coalitional form games to telecommuni-
cations problems and derive a class of games for which this coincidence takes
place. Chun and Hokari (2004) demonstrate the coincidence in the context
of a queueing game defined by Maniquet (1999). The results of these papers
1See also Winter (2002).
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can be summarized as saying that the class of 2-games constitute a sufficient
condition for the coincidence.2
In this paper we identify a class of TU games, which we call PS games,
for which we have this coincidence. In a PS game, each player’s marginal
contribution to a coalition and its complement coalition adds up to a player
specific constant that does not depend on the coalition. We show that this
property is sufficient to ensure the coincidence of the Shapley value and the
prenucleolus. Furthermore, the class of PS games is more general than the
class of 2-games in that while every 2-game is also a PS game, the converse
is not true.
We then apply our result to simple games. We show that a simple game
is a PS game if and only if it is either dictatorial or ‘bi-dictatorial’ or a ‘joint
dictatorship.’ We also show that for a three player non-symmetric simple
game, the PS property is also necessary for the coincidence. However, for
non-symmetric simple games with more than three players, PS property is
not necessary.
Finally, we apply our coincidence result to queueing games. We define
a class of queueing games in coalitional form which we call the generalized
queueing games. This class includes, as special cases, the queueing game
defined by Maniquet (1999) and by Chun (2004). We then identify the sub-
class of generalized queueing games that belong to the class of PS games.
We refer to this class of games as reasonable queueing games. In particular,
all queueing games that are a convex combination of Maniquet’s queueing
game and Chun’s queueing game belongs to this class of reasonable queueing
games.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up the general
model. We provide our main result on the coincidence of prenucleolus and
the Shapley value in section 3 and compare it with the existing literature. In
section 4, we apply our coincidence result to simple games and generalized
queueing games. We conclude our analysis in section 5.
2The 2-games are a special case of the k-games defined by Deng and Papadimitriou
(1994).
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2 Preliminaries
A coalitional form game with transferable utility (or a TU game) G = (N, v)
consists of a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of players and a function v : 2N →
ℜ that associates with every coalition (or subset) S of N a real number
v(S). The number v(S) is the worth of S which is the total payoff that
is available for division among the members of S. We define v(∅) = 0. A
profile (xi)i∈N ∈ ℜ
N is said to be efficient if
∑
i∈N xi = v(N). Let X(N, v)
be the set of all possible efficient payoff vectors of G. An imputation of
G is an efficient payoff profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) for which xi ≥ v(i) for all
i ∈ N . Let I(N, v)(⊆ X(N, v)) be the set of all imputations of G. Let
Mi(S) = v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) be the marginal contribution of player i to the
coalition S. In particular, Mi(∅) = v(i).
DEFINITION 2.1 The Shapley value of a game G = (N, v) is defined by
ψi(N, v) = (1/n!)
∑
π∈ΠMi(Pi(pi)) for each i ∈ N , where Π is the set of all n!
orderings of N and Pi(pi) = {j|pi(j) < pi(i)}.
Consider a game G = (N, v). We now define two very similar solution
concepts that are related to the dissatisfaction level of a coalition. To measure
how unhappy a coalition S will be with a payoff vector x in G, we look at the
excess of S with respect to x which is defined as e(S, x) = v(S) −
∑
i∈S xi.
Using e(S, x) as a measure of unhappiness with respect to x, we can try
to find out a payoff vector which minimizes the maximum excess. We can
construct a vector θ(x) by arranging the set of 2n (subsets of N) excesses in
decreasing order. Consider any two vectors y and z. With y <L z we mean
that y is lexicographically smaller that z and we say that y ≤L z to indicate
that either y <L z or y = z.
DEFINITION 2.2 The prenucleolus of a game G = (N, v) is defined by
pη(N, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | θ(x) ≤L θ(y) ∀ y ∈ X(N, v)}.
DEFINITION 2.3 The nucleolus of a game G = (N, v) is defined by
η(N, v) = {x ∈ I(N, v) | θ(x) ≤L θ(y) ∀ y ∈ I(N, v)}.
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Definitions 2.2 and 2.3 differ in terms of their domain of operation. While
the prenucleolus lexicographically minimizes the excess vector across the set
of all efficient payoff vectors, the nucleolus does the same minimization across
the set of all imputations. It can be shown, however, that the nucleolus and
prenucleolus coincide for TU games with non-empty core3 and for superad-
ditive TU games.4
An equivalent way of defining the two solution concepts is in terms of
objections and counterobjections. We define these as follows.
• A pair (S, y) consisting of a coalition S and an efficient vector (im-
putation) y is an objection to the efficient vector (imputation) x if
e(S, x) > e(S, y) (that is
∑
i∈S yi >
∑
i∈S xi).
• A coalition T is a counterobjection to the objection (y, S) if e(T, y) >
e(T, x) (that is
∑
i∈T xi >
∑
i∈T yi) and e(T, y) ≥ e(S, x).
DEFINITION 2.4 The prenucleolus pη(N, v) of G is the set of all x ∈
X(N, v) such that for every objection (S, y) to x there is a counterobjection
to (S, y). Here, y ∈ X(N, v).
DEFINITION 2.5 The nucleolus η(N, v) of G is the set of all imputations
x ∈ I(N, v) such that for every objection (S, y) to x there is a counterobjec-
tion to (S, y). Here, y ∈ I(N, v).
The equivalence between Definitions 2.3 and 2.5 is derived in Osborne and
Rubinstein (1994). Since this result does not depend on the fact that atten-
tion is restricted to the set of imputations, it follows that Definitions 2.2 and
2.4 are also equivalent.
We end this section with two observations on the coincidence of the Shap-
ley value and the prenucleolus. First, consider a two player game ({1, 2}, v).
A straightforward computation shows that ψi({1, 2}, v) = (v({1, 2})−v(j)+
v(i))/2, i = 1, 2 and that e({1}, ψ(v)) = e({2}, ψ(v)) = (v(1) + v(2) −
3See Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003). The core of a TU game is the set of all unblocked
allocations.
4See Moulin (1988). A TU game is superadditive if for all S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅,
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
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v({1, 2}))/2. The fact that the excess vectors of the two singleton coali-
tions are identical along with the fact that the Shapley value is an efficient
profile immediately implies that the Shapley value is also the prenucleolus.
Next, define a game G = (N, v) to be symmetric if for all i, j ∈ N ,
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N − {i, j}. Again, it is straightforward
to verify that for a symmetric game, ψi(N, v) = pηi(N, v) =
v(N)
|N |
for i ∈ N .
3 PS games
The set of symmetric games and two-players games discussed in the previous
section are obviously a very small subset of coalitional form games. In this
section, we show that the coincidence of Shapley value and the prenucleolus
holds for a richer class of games which we call PS games. We also show that
this class is more general than the class of 2-class games.
DEFINITION 3.6 A TU game G = (N, v) satisfies the PS property if ∀
i ∈ N , ∃ ci ∈ ℜ such that ∀ S ⊆ N − {i}, Mi(S) +Mi(N − {i} − S) = ci.
We refer to any TU game satisfying the PS property as a PS game. We
denote this class of TU games by G(PS).
THEOREM 3.1 If G = (N, v) ∈ G(PS) then ψ(N, v) = pη(N, v).
Proof: Let G = (N, v) ∈ G(PS) and consider the efficient profile x∗ =
(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) such that e(i, x
∗) = e(N−{i}, x∗) for all i ∈ N . It is easy to verify
that x∗ is unique and given by x∗i = (v(N)− v(N − {i}) + v(i)) /2 = ci/2
for all i ∈ N .
Claim 1:
∑
i∈S
x∗i =
v(N)− v(N − S) + v(S)
2
for all S ⊆ N .
We apply induction to prove Claim 1. First note that Claim 1 is true for any
singleton coalition T = {i}. We assume that Claim 1 is true for any T ⊂ N
with the property that |T | = m < n. To prove Claim 1, we will have to show
that it holds for any T ′ = T ∪ {j} where j ∈ N − T . Given the vector x∗
and our assumption we get
x∗j +
∑
i∈T
x∗i =
v(N)− v(N − {j}) + v(j)
2
+
v(N)− v(N − T ) + v(T )
2
(3.1)
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From the PS property we know that Mj(∅) + Mj(N − {j}) = Mj(T ) +
Mj(N − {j} − T )(≡ cj) and hence
v(N)− v(N − {j}) + v(j) = v(T ′)− v(T ) + v(N − T )− v(N − T ′) (3.2)
Substituting (3.2) in (3.1) and then simplifying it we get
∑
i∈T ′
x∗i =
v(N)− v(N − T ′) + v(T ′)
2
(3.3)
Thus, we have established that if Claim 1 is true for any T ⊂ N with the
property that |T | = m < n then Claim 1 is also true for any T ′ ⊂ N with
the property that |T ′| = m+ 1. This proves Claim 1.
Claim 2: x∗ =
(
c1
2
, . . . , cn
2
)
= pη(N, v).
Using Claim 1 one can verify that for all S ⊆ N and S 6= ∅
e(S, x∗) = e(N − S, x∗) =
v(S) + v(N − S)− v(N)
2
(3.4)
From (3.4) it follows that the profile x∗ ∈ X(N, v) has the property that for
every objection (S, y) to x∗, the coalition T = N − S is a counterobjection
to (S, y). To see this, consider any objection (S, y) to x∗. This means that∑
i∈S yi >
∑
i∈S x
∗
i and hence e(N − S, x
∗) < e(N − S, y). To show that
T = N − S is a valid counterobjection to (S, y) we will now show that
e(N−S, y) > e(S, x∗). Observe that e(N−S, y) = v(N−S)−v(N)+
∑
i∈S yi >
v(N−S)−v(N)+
∑
i∈S x
∗
i = e(S, x
∗). The last equality follows from Claim 1
and condition (3.4). Hence from Definition 2.4 it follows that x∗ = pη(N, v).
Claim 3: x∗ =
(
c1
2
, . . . , cn
2
)
= ψ(N, v).
To prove this claim choose any ordering pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) ∈ Π of the agents
in N and its dual pi′ = n + 1− pi = (n + 1− pi1, . . . , n+ 1− pin) ∈ Π. From
PS property it follows that Mi(Pi(pi)) + Mi(Pi(pi
′)) = ci, since Pi(pi
′) =
N −Pi(pi)−{i}. Using the definition of the Shapley value we get ψi(N, v) =
1
n!
(
cin!
2
)
= ci
2
for all i ∈ N . Therefore, x∗ = ψ(N, v).
REMARK 3.1 The following two observations are immediate consequences
of Theorem 3.1: (1) an additive TU game G is a PS game with ci = 2v(i)
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for all i ∈ N and (2) a zero-sum game is a PS game only if it is additive.
REMARK 3.2 Note that the PS property, while strong, is different from
convexity. A game G = (N, v) is convex if and only the marginal contribu-
tion of a player to a coalition is monotone nondecreasing with respect to set
theoretic inclusion. The following examples shows that the PS property and
convexity are independent.
EXAMPLE 3.1 Let G = ({1, 2, 3}, v) with v(1) = v(3) = v(13) = 1,
v(2) = 0, v(23) = 2, v(12) = 3 and v(123) = 4. This game is a PS game
with c1 = 3, c2 = 3, c3 = 2. However, this game is not convex since v(123)−
v(23) = 2 < 3 = v(12) − v(2). To see that convexity does not imply the
PS property, let G = ({1, 2, 3}, w) with w(1) = w(2) = w(3) = 0, w(12) =
w(13) = 0.5, w(23) = 1, w(123) = 3. This game is convex but it does not
satisfy the PS property for player 1 because w(12)−w(2)+w(13)−w(3) =
1 6= 2 = w(123)− w(23) + w(1)− w(∅).
3.1 The class of k games
The following definition is due to Deng and Papadimitriou (1994).
DEFINITION 3.7 A coalitional form game Gk = (N, v) is a k-game if
v(S) =


0 if |S| < k∑
T⊆S,|T |=k
v(T ) otherwise
Observe that a 1-game is simply an additive game and hence it is a PS
game. In different applications of cooperative game theory, the 2-game has
led to the coincidence of prenucleolus and the Shapley value.5 The following
proposition establishes that every 2-game is a PS game.
PROPOSITION 3.1 A 2-game G = (N, v) is a PS game.
5See Brown and Housman (1988), Chun and Hokari (2005), Deng and Papadimitriou
(1994) and Nouweland, Borm, Brouwers, Bruinderink and Tijs (1996)).
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Proof: It follows from the definition of a 2-game that for all i ∈ N and all
S ⊆ N − {i},
Mi(S) +Mi(N − S − {i}) =
∑
j∈S
v(ij) +
∑
j∈N−S−{i}
v(ij) =
∑
j∈N−{i}
v(ij).
This shows that a 2-game is a PS game with ci =
∑
j∈N−{i} v(ij) for all
i ∈ N .
The converse of Proposition 3.1 is not true. In particular, the TU game
({1, 2, 3}, v) in Example 3.1 is a PS game but not a 2-game.
4 Applications
In this section, we consider some applications of cooperative game theory
where our main result can be applied.
4.1 Simple Games
Simple games—where the value of a coalition is either zero or one—are games
used mainly to describe parliaments, councils and committees. They occur
in many applications of game theory to political science.6 The Shapley value
in the context of simple games is a measure of the “power” of individual play-
ers and is better known as the Shapley-Shubik index.7 Peleg and Sudho¨lter
(2003) have studied the nucleolus in the context of simple games. Before
analyzing the PS property in this context, we provide some relevant defini-
tions.
DEFINITION 4.8 A game G = (N, v) is a simple game if (i) v(S) ∈
{0, 1} for all S ⊆ N , (ii) v(N) = 1 and (iii) if v(S) = 1 and S ⊂ T then
v(T ) = 1.
DEFINITION 4.9 The simple game Gs = (N, v) is dictatorial if there
exists a player i ∈ N such that for all S ⊆ N , v(S) = 1 if and only if i ∈ S.
6See Shapley (1962) and Curiel (1996).
7See Shapley and Shubik (1954).
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DEFINITION 4.10 The simple game Gs = (N, v) is bi-dictatorial if
there exist two distinct players i, j ∈ N such that v(S) = 1 if and only if
{i, j} ∩ S 6= ∅.
DEFINITION 4.11 The simple game Gs = (N, v) is a joint dictatorship
if there exists two distinct players i, j ∈ N such that v(S) = 1 if and only if
{i, j} ⊂ S.
We shall need the following terminology in proving the main result of this
section. Let G = (N, v) be a simple game. A coalition S is a swing for player
i if v(S ∪ {i}) = 1 and v(T ) = 0 for all T ⊆ S. Player i is a null player if
Mi(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N − {i}.
PROPOSITION 4.2 The simple game Gs = (N, v) is a PS game if and
only if it is either dictatorial or bi-dictatorial or a joint dictatorship.
Proof: (Necessity) In a simple game, Mi(S) = 1 if S is a swing coalition
for i and zero otherwise. Hence, Mi(S) ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N . Therefore, a
simple game Gs is a PS game only if for all i ∈ N and for all S ⊆ N − {i},
ci = Mi(S) + Mi(N − S − {i}) ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Moreover, for a simple game
satisfying the PS property, Theorem 3.1 implies that the Shapley Value and
the prenucleolus are given by ψi(N, v) = pηi(N, v) = ci/2 for all i ∈ N . Since
both solutions are efficient, we have
∑
k∈N ψk(N, v) =
∑
k∈N pηk(N, v) =∑
k∈N ck/2 = 1. Therefore, given ci ∈ {0, 1, 2} for all i ∈ N and
∑
k∈N ck = 2,
we have two possibilities.
Case 1 The simple game Gs(N, v) is a PS game such that there exists i ∈ N
with ci = 2 and ck = 0 for all k ∈ N − {i}.
Case 2 The simple game Gs(N, v) is a PS game such that there exists i, j ∈ N
with ci = cj = 1 and ck = 0 for all k ∈ N − {i, j}.
Case 1: Since ci = Mi(S) +Mi(N − S − {i}) = 2 for all S ⊆ N − {i}, this
implies that Mi(S) = 1 for all S ⊆ N − {i} and hence v(S ∪ {i}) = 1 and
v(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N − {i}. Hence, the simple game is dictatorial.
Case 2: We will show that the simple game must be either bi-dictatorial or
a joint dictatorship. We first prove the following claim.
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Claim: If ci = cj = 1 and ck = 0 for all k ∈ N − {i, j}, then v(S ∪ {i}) =
v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N − {i, j}.
We prove this claim by contradiction. Suppose that there exists S ⊆
N − {i, j} such that v(S ∪ {i}) 6= v(S ∪ {j}). Without loss of generality let
v(S ∪ {i}) = 1 > v(S ∪ {j}) = 0. (4.5)
Since ci = cj = 1, it follows that
Mi(S) +Mi(N − S − {i}) =Mj(S) +Mj(N − S − {j}) = 1. (4.6)
Since v(S ∪ {j}) = 0, the monotonoicity of a simple game implies that
v(S) = 0.8 Hence, by (4.5), Mi(S) = 1 and Mj(S) = 0. By (4.6), it
follows that Mj(N − S − {j}) = 1 > Mi(N − S − {i}) = 0. Therefore,
v(N − S) = v(N − S − {i}) = 1 > v(N − S − {j}) = 0. Using (4.5)
and (4.6) again, we get v(S ∪ {i}) = 1, v(Sc ∪ {i}) = 0, v(S ∪ {j}) = 0 and
v(Sc∪{j}) = 1 where Sc = N−S−{i, j}. Since ck = 0 for all k ∈ N−{i, j},
all such players are null players. Adding the null players in Sc to S ∪{i}, we
get v(Sc∪S ∪{i}) = v(S ∪{i}). Hence, v(N −{j}) = 1. On the other hand,
adding the null players of S to Sc ∪ {i}, we get v(S ∪Sc ∪ {i}) = v(Sc ∪ {i})
which implies v(N − {j}) = 0. This is a contradiction and proves the claim.
From the above claim it follows that players i and j are symmetric. Now
consider player i. Since ci = Mi(j) + Mi(N − {i, j}) = 1, we have two
possibilities.
2a) Mi(j) = 0 and Mi(N − {i, j}) = 1
2b) Mi(j) = 1 and Mi(N − {i, j}) = 0
If 2a) is true, then v(N−{j}) = 1. Using symmetry of players i and j we get
v(N − {i}) = 1. Moreover, all players k ∈ N − {i, j} are null players (since
ck = 0) and therefore, by the monotonicity property of the simple game,
v(T − {i}) = v(T − {j}) = 1 for all T ⊆ N such that i, j ∈ T . Thus, for
T = {i, j} we get v(i) = v(j) = 1. Monotonicity of the simple game gives
8See Definition 4.8(iii).
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that for l ∈ {i, j}, v(S∪{l}) = 1 > v(S) for all S ⊆ N−{i, j} andMi(j) = 0
gives v(ij) = v(i) = v(j) = 1. So {i, j} are the only dictators.
If 2b) is true, then v(ij) = 1 > v(j) = 0. Using the fact that all players
k ∈ N−{i, j} are null players and the symmetry of i and j we get v(S∪{i}) =
v(S ∪ {j}) = 0 for all S ⊆ N − {i, j}. Using v(ij) = 1 and monotonicity of
simple games we get v(T ) = 1 for all T ⊆ N such that i, j ∈ T . So i and j
are joint dictators.
(Sufficiency) If a simple game is dictatorial, then for the dictator i,Mi(S) =
1 for all S ⊆ N−{i} and henceMi(S)+Mi(N−S−{i}) = 2 = ci. Moreover,
since all other players are null players, for all k ∈ N − {i}, Mk(S) = 0 and
hence Mk(S) +Mi(N − S − {k}) = 0 = ck for all S ∈ N − {k}. Therefore,
if a simple game is dictatorial then it is a PS game.
If a simple game is bi-dictatorial, then players i and j are the two dictators
and all other players in N − {i, j} are null players. Consider player i. Note
that for player i, Mi(S) = 0 if j ∈ S and Mi(S) = 1 if j 6∈ S. Thus, player i
is a swing for a coalition S if j 6∈ S and player i is not a swing for a coalition
S if j ∈ S. Therefore, for all S ⊆ N − {i}, Mi(S) +Mi(N − S − {i}) = 1
since either (a) j ∈ S ⇔ j 6∈ N − S − {i} or (b) j 6∈ S ⇔ j ∈ N − S − {i}.
A same sort of reasoning holds for player j. Any player k ∈ N − {i, j} is a
null player, we get ck = 0 for all k ∈ N − {i, j}. Therefore, if a simple game
is bi-dictatorial then it is a PS game.
Now consider a simple game which is a joint dictatorship with i and j the
joint dictators and all other players in N −{i, j} are null players. For player
i, Mi(S) = 0 if j 6∈ S and Mi(S) = 1 if j ∈ S. Thus, player i is a swing for
a coalition S if j ∈ S and player i is not a swing for a coalition S if j 6∈ S.
Therefore, for all S ⊆ N − {i}, Mi(S) +Mi(N − S − {i}) = 1 since either
(a) j ∈ S ⇔ j 6∈ N − S − {i} or (b) j 6∈ S ⇔ j ∈ N − S − {i}. A similar
reasoning holds for player j. Since any player k ∈ N −{i, j} is a null player,
we get ck = 0 for all k ∈ N − {i, j}. This shows that a joint dictatorship is
a PS game and concludes the proof of the theorem.
We conclude this section with two observations.
1. For a non-symmetric three player simple game, PS property is nec-
essary for the coincidence. There can be exactly two types of non-
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symmetric three player simple games that are not PS games. They are
(a) G¯s = ({i, j, k}, v) with v(j) = v(k) = 0, v(i) = v(ij) = v(ik) =
v(jk) = v(ijk) = 1 and (b) G˜s = ({i, j, k}, v) with v(i) = v(j) = v(k) =
v(jk) = 0, v(ij) = v(ik) = v(ijk) = 1. For G¯s, ψ(N, v) = (2
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) 6=
pη(N, v) = (1
2
, 1
4
, 1
4
). For G˜s, ψ(N, v) = (2
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) 6= pη(N, v) = (1, 0, 0).
Thus, for non-symmetric three player games that are not PS games,
ψ(N, v) 6= pη(N, v).
2. For a non-symmetric simple game with more than three players, PS
property is not necessary for the coincidence. Consider the TU game
Gs = ({1, 2, 3, 4}, v) where v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = v(4) = v(13) =
v(14) = v(23) = v(24) = v(34) = 0, v(12) = 1, v(S) = 1 for all
S ⊆ {1, 2, 3, 4} such that |S| ≥ 3. Gs is not a PS game (since M1(∅)+
M1(234) < M1(2) +M1(34)) and yet ψ(N, v) = pη(N, v) = (
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
6
, 1
6
).
4.2 Generalized queueing games
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents. Each agent wants to consume
a service provided by a server. It is assumed that agents can be served
only sequentially and that serving any agent occupies a unit of time. Each
agent is identified with a waiting cost θi ∈ ℜ+ which is her disutility of
waiting in the queue. If agent i occupies the σith position in the queue,
then her cost is −(σi − 1)θi. Let θN = (θ1, . . . , θn) be a profile of waiting
costs of all the agents. Given a profile of waiting cost θN = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈
ℜn+ and a non-empty set S(⊆ N) of agents with associated waiting costs
θS = (θi)i∈S, a queue σ
∗(θS) = {σ
∗
i (θS)}i∈S ∈ τ(|S|) is said to be S-efficient
if it minimizes the aggregate waiting costs for the set of S agents, that is
σ∗(θS) ∈ argminσ∈τ(|S|)
∑
i∈S(σi − 1)θi where τ(|S|) is the set of all possible
permutations of the integers {1, . . . , |S|}. The queue σ∗(θN) is said to be an
efficient queue for the set of N agents.
There are different ways of modeling queueing situation as a coalitional
form TU game. Maniquet (1999) has one way of defining a queueing game
in coalitional form. He defines v(S) = −
∑
i∈S(σ
∗
i (θS) − 1)θi for all S ⊆ N .
This is an optimistic approach to the queueing problem because a coalition
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S thinks that its members will be served first in the queue (that is, before
the agents of coalition N − S). Hence, they agree to the S-efficient queue
amongst themselves. The other approach is the pessimistic approach of Chun
(2004) where each coalition thinks that its members will be served only after
all the members of their complement coalition has been served. So for Chun’s
game, v(S) = −
∑
i∈S(n− |S|+ σ
∗
i (θS)− 1)θi for all S ⊆ N .
DEFINITION 4.12 A TU game GQ = (N, v) is a generalized queueing
game if given any θN = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ ℜ
n
+,
1. v(S) =
∑
i∈S
a (|S|, σ∗i (θS)) θi for all S ⊆ N with S 6= ∅,
2. ∀ S ⊂ N , |S| > 1, {a (|S|, k + 1) < a (|S|, k) ≤ 0} ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . , |S|−1}.
3. a (|N |, σ∗i (θN )) = −(σ
∗
i (θN)− 1) for all i ∈ N and
4. a(1, 1) ∈ [−(n− 1), 0].
This is a very general way of representing a queueing situation as a coalitional
form game. The first condition simply gives us the worth of a coalition. The
second restriction simply guarantees that in a coalition the agent served ear-
lier incur lower waiting cost than agents served later. The third restriction
follows from efficiency condition for the grand coalition. The fourth restric-
tion that a(1, 1) ∈ [−(n− 1), 0] is reasonable in the sense that the best thing
that can happen to a single agent is that the agent gets first position in the
queue implying a(1, 1) must be at most zero and the worst thing that can
happen to a singleton coalition is to get the last queue position which means
that a(1, 1) must be weakly greater than −(n− 1).
Observe that if a (|S|, σ∗i (θS)) = −(σ
∗(θS)−1) for all S ⊆ N then we have
Maniquet’s queueing game (see Maniquet (1999)) and if a (|S|, σ∗i (θS)) =
−(n − |S|+ σ∗(θS) − 1) for all S ⊆ N then we have Chun’s queueing game
(see Chun (2004)). Using this general specification we try to identify the
sub-class of generalized queueing games that are PS games.
DEFINITION 4.13 A generalized queueing game GQ is said to be a rea-
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sonable queueing game if for all non-empty sets S ⊆ N ,
a (|S|, σ∗i (θS)) = −{δ(n− |S|) + (σ
∗
i (θS)− 1)} (4.7)
where σ∗i (θS) ∈ {1, . . . , |S|} and δ = −
a(1,1)
(n−1)
∈ [0, 1].
We can interpret condition (4.7) in the following way. In our generalized
queueing game, a(|S|, σ⋆i (θS)) measures the externality imposed by all agents
(that is, agents from the set N − {i}) on an agent i ∈ S whose queue
position is σ∗i (θS) in the S-efficient queue. For a reasonable queueing game,
a(|S|, σ⋆i (θS)) has two components. The component (σ
∗
i (θS))−1) captures the
externality imposed upon i ∈ S by her group members. The term δ(n− |S|)
captures the externality imposed on agent i ∈ S by outsiders (that is, agents
in N − S). It shows that the externality imposed by the outsiders (that is,
N − S) is proportional to the number of outsiders.
PROPOSITION 4.3 A generalized queueing game GQ is a PS game if
and only if it is a reasonable queueing game.
Proof: For PS property it is necessary that for all i ∈ N and for all S ⊆
N−{i},MCi(S)+MCi(N−{i}−S) = ci, where ci is a number independent
of S. For a generalized queueing problem this means that given any θN =
(θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ ℜ
n
+ and any i ∈ N ,
αi(S)θi +
∑
j∈S
βj(S)θj +
∑
l∈N−S
γl(S)θl = ci (4.8)
for all S ⊆ N − {i}. Here αi(S), βj(S) and γl(S) have the following expres-
sions:
(1) αi(S) = a
(
|S|+ 1, σ∗i (θS∪{i})
)
+ a (|N − S|, σ∗i (θN−S)),
(2) βj(S) = a
(
|S|+ 1, σ∗j (θS∪{i})
)
− a
(
|S|, σ∗j (θS)
)
and
(3) γl(S) = a (|N − S|, σ
∗
l (θN−S))− a
(
|N − S| − 1, σ∗l (θN−{i}−S)
)
.
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We first argue that αi(S) must be independent of S. Consider any state
θN ∈ ℜ
n
+ with the property that θj 6= θl for all j, l ∈ N with j 6= l, any agent
i ∈ N and any two distinct sets S1 and S2 such that S1 ⊂ S2 ⊆ N−{i}. Using
condition (4.8) for S1 and for S2 separately and then taking their difference
we get
(αi(S2)− αi(S1))θi +
∑
j 6=i
z(S2, S1)θj = 0 (4.9)
Now consider another state θ′N ∈ ℜ
n
+ with the property that θ
′
j = θj for
all j ∈ N − {i}, θ′i 6= θi and σ
∗(θ′N ) = σ
∗(θN). Therefore, the state θ
′
N is
constructed from the state θN by perturbing the waiting cost of agent i in
such a way that the efficient queue remains unchanged under both the states.
Like in the earlier case, consider the sets S1 and S2. Using condition (4.8)
for S1 and for S2 separately and then taking their difference we get
(αi(S2)− αi(S1))θ
′
i +
∑
j 6=i
z(S2, S1)θj = 0 (4.10)
By subtracting (4.9) from (4.10) we get
(αi(S2)− αi(S1))(θ
′
i − θi) = 0 (4.11)
Condition (4.11) implies that αi(S1) = αi(S2) since θ
′
i 6= θi. Since the selec-
tion of S1 and S2 was arbitrary, it follows that for any i ∈ N ,
(a) αi(S) = αi for all S ⊆ N − {i}.
Observe that given any θN = (θ1, . . . , θn) and any i ∈ N with queue position
σ∗i (θN),
(b) if σ∗i (θS∪{i}) = y then σ
∗
i (θN−S) = σ
∗(θN ) + 1− y.
From (1), (a) and (b) we get the following: Given any queue position σ∗i (θN ) =
q ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all x ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all y ∈ {1, . . . , min[q, x]}
a(x, y) + a(n + 1− x, q + 1− y) = −(q − 1) + a(1, 1) (4.12)
Consider a coalition S such that i, j 6∈ S, x = |S| + 1, σ∗i (θN ) = q <
σ∗j (θN) = q + 1 and σl(θN) > σj(θN ) for all l ∈ S. Using condition (4.12) for
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agents i and j separately we get
a(x, 1) + a(n+ 1− x, q) = −(q − 1) + a(1, 1) (4.13)
a(x, 1) + a(n + 1− x, q + 1) = −q + a(1, 1) (4.14)
Subtracting (4.14) from (4.13) we get
a(n + 1− x, q)− a(n+ 1− x, q + 1) = 1 (4.15)
Solving condition (4.15) we get for all q ≤ r ≡ n + 1− x,
a(r, q) = a(r, 1)− (q − 1) (4.16)
Using condition (4.16) in the generalized queueing problem we get for all
S ⊆ N ,
v(S) =
∑
i∈S
[a(|S|, 1)− (σ∗i (θS)− 1)] θi (4.17)
Using observation (b) in condition (4.12) for q = 1 we get for all x ∈
{1, . . . , n− 1},
a(x, 1) + a(n + 1− x, 1) = a(1, 1) (4.18)
Now consider the term βj(S) = a
(
|S|+ 1, σ∗j (θS∪{i})
)
− a
(
|S|, σ∗j (θS)
)
in
condition (4.8). We argue that for |N | ≥ 3, βj(S) term is independent of S
for any j ∈ S ⊆ N − {i} such that σ∗j (θN) < σ
∗
i (θN ). Consider any state
θN ∈ ℜ
n
+ with the property that θl 6= θk for all k, l ∈ N with k 6= l and
consider j ∈ T1 ⊂ T2 ⊆ N − {i}. By applying condition (4.8) for the sets T1
and T2 separately and then taking the difference we get
(βj(T2)− βj(T1))θj +
∑
l∈N−{i,j}
zˆ(T2, T1)θl = 0 (4.19)
Observe that in (4.19), condition (a) guarantees that the left hand side is
independent of θi. Now consider another state θ
′
N ∈ ℜ
n
+ with the property
that θ′l = θl for all l ∈ N − {j}, θ
′
j 6= θj and σ
∗(θ′N) = σ
∗(θN). Therefore,
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the state θ′N is constructed from the state θN by perturbing the waiting cost
of agent j in such a way that the efficient queue remains unchanged under
both the states. Like in the earlier case, consider the sets T1 and T2. Using
condition (4.8) for T1 and for T2 separately and then taking their difference
we get
(βj(T2)− βj(T1))θ
′
j +
∑
l∈N−{i,j}
zˆ(T2, T1)θl = 0 (4.20)
By subtracting (4.19) from (4.20) we get
(βj(T2)− βj(T1))(θ
′
j − θj) = 0 (4.21)
Condition (4.21) gives that
(c) ∀ j ∈ T1 ⊂ T2 ⊆ N − {i} such that σ
∗
j (θN ) < σ
∗
i (θN ), βj(T2) = βj(T1)
since θ′j 6= θj .
(d) Observe that if σ∗j (θN) < σ
∗
i (θN ) then for all S ⊆ N − {i} such that
j ∈ S, σ∗j (θS∪{i}) = σ
∗
j (θS) and hence βj(S) = a(|S| + 1, σ
∗
j (θS)) −
a(|S|, σ∗j (θS)).
From observations (c) and (d) we get for all x ∈ {1, . . . , n − 2} and for all
p ∈ {1, . . . , x},
a(x+ 1, p)− a(x, p) = e¯ (4.22)
Using (4.16) in (4.22) we get
a(x+ 1, 1)− a(x, 1) = e¯ (4.23)
From (4.23) we get x ∈ {1, . . . , n− 2}
a(x, 1) = (x− 1)e¯+ a(1, 1) (4.24)
From (4.18) and (4.24) we get
a(x, 1) =
(
n− x
n− 1
)
a(1, 1) (4.25)
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By substituting condition (4.25) in (4.17) we get
v(S) =
∑
i∈S
[(
n− |S|
n− 1
)
a(1, 1)− (σ∗i (θS)− 1)
]
θi (4.26)
Substituting a(1,1)
n−1
= −δ in (4.26) we get the result.
To prove the sufficiency part, note that for a realistic queueing game we
have for all i ∈ N and for all S ⊆ N − {i},
MCi(S)+MCi(N−S−{i}) = −a(1, 1)
∑
j∈N−{i}
θj−(σ
∗
i (θN )−1)θi−
∑
s∈P c
i
(σ∗(θN ))
θs (4.27)
where P ci (σ
∗(θN)) = {s ∈ N − {i} | σ
∗
i (θN) < σ
∗
s(θN )}. Observe that the
right hand side of (4.27) is independent of S.
Proposition 4.3 establishes that for a reasonable queueing game, the Shap-
ley value will coincide with prenucleolus. Observe, that if in a reasonable
queueing game, δ = 0 then we have Maniquet’s optimistic queueing game
which gives no weightage to the players outside the coalition. If δ = 1 we
have Chun’s pessimistic queueing game that gives full weightage to the play-
ers outsider the coalition. Therefore, our reasonable class of queueing games
includes all queueing games that are a convex combination of the optimistic
and the pessimistic queueing games and all these games are PS games.
5 Conclusion
The chief contribution of this paper has been to shed further light on the
coincidence of the Shapley value and the prenucleolus. As noted earlier,
these solutions are motivated by very different concerns and as such, there
is no reason to expect them to coincide. We have extended previous work
(Deng and Papadimitriou (1994), Nouweland et al (1996) and Chun and
Hokari (2004)) on this coincidence by providing a more general sufficiency
condition. In addition, we have used this sufficiency condition to identify the
subclasses of simple games and queueing games where this coincidence holds.
A remaining agenda is to identify a necessary condition for this coincidence,
at least in the context of simple games and queueing games.
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